Director of the Centre of Discourse Studies, Teun A. van Dijk, an internationally renowned scholar in critical discourse studies and a member of the Scientific Advisory Committee of our research centre, MIRCo-UAM, examines in this article the effects of censorship imposed by the PP–Vox coalition government in Castile and León.
In 1933, shortly after coming to power, the Nazis initiated a process in Germany known as Gleichschaltung, literally “synchronization” or “bringing into line,” whose aim was to subordinate all institutions in society to the ideological principles of the new regime. This involved more than controlling the state, the administration, or political parties. It also extended to education, universities, the press, literature, theater, cinema, and every other form of cultural expression. Diversity of opinion and perspective was to disappear, giving way to an ideologically homogeneous national culture. Under the leadership of Joseph Goebbels, the Reich Chamber of Culture became one of the principal instruments of this policy. Artists and writers who failed to comply with the regime’s demands could lose the right to practice their professions.
Almost a century later, it would be absurd to claim that Spain finds itself in a situation comparable to Nazi Germany. History teaches us, however, that authoritarian processes do not necessarily begin with the abolition of elections or the banning of political parties. They can also begin with seemingly administrative measures that progressively restrict fundamental freedoms. A recent news report concerning the cultural policy of the regional government of Castile and León, formed by the People’s Party (PP) and Vox, should concern us for precisely this reason.
As reported by El País on November 12, the Regional Ministry of Culture of Castile and León requires filmmakers applying for public funding to sign a declaration committing themselves not to engage in any activity involving “ideological indoctrination, partisan propaganda, or explicit support for specific political positions.” The declaration also invokes seemingly unobjectionable principles such as objectivity, institutional neutrality, pluralism, and the public interest.
At first glance, these requirements might appear reasonable. Who would support ideological indoctrination? Yet the fundamental problem lies precisely in how these concepts are defined and, above all, in who has the power to apply them. What does “ideological indoctrination” mean in a film? Does a film denouncing racism, violence against women, or social inequality constitute indoctrination? Could a work that criticizes Francoism, defends immigrants’ rights, or portrays homosexual people positively be considered ideological? And would a film celebrating the traditional family, the Catholic religion, or Spanish nationalism be regarded with equal suspicion?
The question is not merely theoretical. When a government claims the authority to decide which cultural content is ideological and which is not, it turns its own political preferences into criteria of artistic legitimacy. Supposed neutrality can thus become an instrument of discrimination. What accords with the dominant ideology is presented as natural, objective, or neutral, while critical perspectives are denounced as ideological.
Research on discourse and ideology has shown us that this distinction is profoundly misleading. Ideologies are not the exclusive preserve of political opponents. They also organize the beliefs, values, and interpretations of those in power. A conservative film is no less ideological than a progressive one. The difference arises when those who exercise power claim that their own positions represent common sense, while all others constitute a threat to society.
Moreover, the measure introduces a particularly troubling mechanism: self-censorship. It is not necessary to ban a film explicitly in order to restrict artistic freedom. It is enough for its creators to know that certain political or social interpretations could jeopardize funding for their projects. Faced with uncertainty, many will prefer to avoid controversial subjects. Others will alter their scripts to anticipate possible objections from the officials responsible for evaluating applications. In this way, ideological control can operate without a single formal prohibition.
Spain is well acquainted with the consequences of such practices. During the Franco dictatorship, censorship of cinema, literature, and journalism did more than prohibit particular works; it shaped cultural production in advance. Writers, directors, and journalists learned to recognize the boundaries of what was permissible. Direct repression and self-censorship reinforced one another. Spain’s transition to democracy represented precisely the overcoming of that system, through the constitutional recognition of freedom of expression, artistic creation, and scientific research.
The comparison with Nazi Gleichschaltung must, of course, be understood with all the necessary historical distinctions. The cultural policy of Castile and León does not constitute a totalitarian system, nor is it equivalent to the brutal persecution of artists and intellectuals under Nazism. But there are troubling similarities in the political logic that seeks to subordinate culture to ideological criteria defined by those in power. History does not necessarily repeat itself in identical form. What matters is recognizing, in time, the mechanisms that can lead to the erosion of democratic freedoms.
The concern takes on a national dimension given the possibility that the People’s Party and Vox could form a government after the next general election. We cannot know what policies they would adopt, but the experience of regional governments allows us to examine their priorities and anticipate risks. If a regional administration considers it legitimate to make film subsidies conditional on ideological commitments, what would prevent similar criteria from being extended to other cultural institutions, public media, universities, or scientific research?

Academic freedom deserves particular attention. Scientific research, especially in the social sciences and humanities, addresses questions that inevitably have political implications: social inequalities, racism, migration, climate change, historical memory, gender relations, and human rights. Could researchers working on these subjects be accused of ideological indoctrination? Would public research funding be made conditional on a supposed neutrality defined by the government? A university that must adapt its research questions to the ideological preferences of those in power ceases to fulfill its critical role in a democratic society.
Of course, no government is obliged to fund every cultural or scientific project. Public grants require transparent criteria of quality, relevance, and feasibility. But there is a fundamental difference between assessing the quality of a work and judging its ideological orientation. Public money belongs to all citizens, not to the party temporarily in government. For precisely that reason, public institutions must guarantee pluralism, even when the works they fund challenge the ideas of those who administer the resources.
The paradox is clear: in the name of combating ideology, a mechanism of ideological control is introduced. In the name of pluralism, the diversity of perspectives is threatened with restriction. And in the name of institutional neutrality, the administration’s duty of impartiality is confused with a nonexistent obligation on artists to remain politically neutral.
Democracy is not simply a matter of holding free elections. It also requires independent institutions, a critical press, autonomous universities, and a culture capable of questioning power. Artistic and academic freedom is not a privilege granted by governments, but a fundamental condition of an open society.
For this reason, what has happened in Castile and León should not be regarded as a minor cultural controversy or a mere administrative dispute over film subsidies. It is a warning sign that deserves a firm response from artists, intellectuals, universities, and democratic organizations. Not because Spain is experiencing a new Gleichschaltung, but precisely to prevent practices that subordinate culture to ideological control from becoming normalized.
The defense of democracy also begins with defending the freedom of those who create, conduct research, teach, and dare to think differently.
Teun A. van Dijk
Centre of Discourse Studies, Barcelona